Acquisition announcements generate predictable movements in the price of the acquirer's stock. For example, post-announcement returns are typically negative for high Tobin's q acquirers, stock transactions, and foreign targets, but positive for private equity-backed private targets. Pre-announcement trading of acquirer's stock is more likely to be attributable to insider trading when the pre-announcement price changes match the expected post-announcement acquirer returns. Based on a sample of Canadian acquirers and public and private acquisition targets from Canada, the U.S. and 31 other countries over the years 1991-2008, we find evidence consistent with insider trading of acquirer's stock. This evidence, however, is limited to specific situations and is far from generalizable to all types of acquisition announcements. Our findings have policy implications for the allocation of surveillance efforts for initiating insider trading investigations.
Introduction
Abnormal returns prior to the announcement of an acquisition do not by themselves imply the existence of insider trading. Detecting insider trading prior to an acquisition is a difficult task, rendering surveillance of insider trading and enforcement of insider trading laws problematic. In fact, empirical evidence has shown that insider trading laws by themselves without effective surveillance or enforcement can have the perverse effects of increasing the acquisition costs and making the market reaction to acquisition announcements stronger, thereby increasing the profits to, and hence prevalence of, insider trading (Bris, 2005; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2009) . Empirical studies have shown that even some developed countries, such as Canada, appear to be among the worst in the world for the prevalence of insider trading (Bris, 2005) . Other papers suggest that the pre-announcement price run-up is actually due to the investors' ability to correctly predict the pending takeover bid instead of insider trading (Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990) .
In light of the difficult task of detecting insider trading (and distinguishing it from market timing) and enforcing prohibitions against illegal insider trading, it is worthwhile examining situations when price movements prior to the announcement of an acquisition are consistent with insider trading and warrant further investigation. The price response to the announcement of an acquisition generates predictable movements in acquirer's stock depending on the characteristics of the acquisition. For instance, post-announcement returns are typically smaller or even negative for acquirers of foreign firms due to transactional completion risks, information asymmetries and transaction costs (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000) . Post-announcement returns are typically negative when the acquirer pays in shares and has a high Tobin's q because the market inference is that the acquirer's equity is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . By contrast, announcement returns are positive for acquirers that purchase private equity (PE)-backed private companies due to the governance and value-added provided by the PE investors (Masulis and Nahata, 2009 ). Taken together, this body of evidence shows the announcement effects of acquisitions on acquirer's stock are predictable. Cases where the pre-announcement run-up matches expected post-announcement acquirer returns warrant further investigation for possible insider trading.
In this paper we consider pre-announcement stock price and transaction dynamics of Canadian acquirers that acquire private and public domestic and international targets. To the best of our knowledge, prior work has not explored the pre-announcement run-up of the acquirer in response to public versus private acquisitions. In this paper, we make use of detailed data that enables the analysis of pre-announcement run-ups in relation to predictable post-announcement returns.
Canada offers an interesting institutional setting to study insider trading of acquirer's stock for a number of reasons. First, targets are not just public companies; a significant number of acquisitions also involve private firms. Second, a significant number of targets are not based in Canada, but rather, they are based in the U.S. and many other countries around the world. This type of heterogeneity in the data enables assessment of different types of target firms and associated prebid announcement of the dynamics of prices and transactions. Third, while Canadian legal systems are similar to the U.S., there appears to be a comparative dearth of enforcement in Canada relative to the U.S., thereby leading prior international empirical studies of insider trading to rank Canada as the most prevalent insider trading nation in the world (Bris, 2005) .
We consider a sample of 770 Canadian acquisition announcements of public and private targets based in Canada, the U.S. and 31 other countries over the years [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The data consistently indicate that pre-bid announcement run-ups in cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter "run-up CARs") vary in predictable ways. It is noteworthy that these run-ups are not apparent in aggregate; rather, one must investigate the specific characteristics of the acquisition and compare announcement returns for acquisitions with similar characteristics, and then compare the expected announcement effect with the CARs over the run-up period.
Specifically, the data indicate run-up CARs are lower for acquisitions when the bidder has a higher Tobin's q and exhibits greater information asymmetry as proxied by the standard deviation of the market model ,which is used to estimate the abnormal return. Run-up CARs are lower for foreign targets, but higher for PE-backed private targets (consistent with Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007) . These findings are consistent with studies of announcement effects of foreign acquisitions in Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and announcement of PE-backed acquisitions. For non-PE-backed acquisitions, run-up CARs are on average negative, but there is significant heterogeneity across quintiles. Finally, run-up CARs are lower for share payments, consistent with theory in Myers and Majluf (1984) showing negative performance associated with signals from insiders that their equity is overvalued. These findings are both statistically and economically significant and robust to a number of robustness checks, such as 2-step treatment regressions for the non-random choice to target a private firm, alternative explanatory variables, different event window lengths, and subsets of the data. Further, we analyze different market benchmarks for generating CARs, and examine cumulative abnormal volume, transactions and turnover.
Our findings have policy implications for guiding surveillance authorities in terms of optimizing insider trading investigations. The data and findings enable regulators to examine announcement of different types of acquisition transaction more efficiently. That is, the data and empirics provide guidance as to where insider trading is more likely to be observed, and as such, where surveillance and enforcement could be more efficiently directed. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature and summarizes stylized facts for the post-announcement returns. Section 3 introduces the data and provides summary statistics. Multivariate regression analyses are presented in section 4. Concluding remarks follow in section 5.
Related Literature and Stylized Facts
Empirical studies show that the stock price performance of an acquirer depends on the deal and firm characteristics, including target public status, method of payment and relative size (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al, 2002; Moeller, 2004) . Consistent with this extant evidence, our prior is to expect a relationship between those features and the run-up CARs.
Moreover, if the run-up CARs are actually due to insider trading, the magnitude of the price movement should be affected by the leakage of private information, or information asymmetry.
Considering our international setting, we expect that the pre-announcement will differ between domestic, U.S., and other foreign acquisitions. At a broad level, we expect the run-up CARs to match expected post-announcement returns if there is an insider trading action worth investigating.
To this end, in this section we review related literature that has established stylized facts regarding the extent to which announcement returns are predictable.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to the literature that studies price run-up before takeover announcements. This literature focuses on the price dynamics of target firms and not the acquirer.
These studies find that, in general, target firms experience significant price increases prior to the public announcement of the takeover event.
1 For example, Keown and Pinketon (1981) examine a sample of 194 firms involved in takeover bids and find that approximately half of the market reaction occurs before the first public announcement date. The substantial price increase in target shares are interpreted as preliminary evidence of insider trading on non-public material information, and thereby followed up with an examination of the trading activities of corporate insiders. Using a unique database of prosecuted SEC insider trading cases from 1980 to 1989, Meulbroek (1992) confirms that CAR on insider trading days is half as large as CAR on information announcement days, and 43% of the price run-up occurs on insider trading days.
Jabbour et al. (2000) find that abnormal stock price performance at an early stage before the acquisition announcement is due to actual trading by corporate insiders using a sample of 128
Canadian acquisitions from 1985 through 1995. Related evidence shows unusual trading activity before takeover announcements (Keown and Pinketon, 1981; Meulbroek, 1992; King, 2009) .
Comparatively fewer studies examine price and trading activities of the acquirer firm prior to the announcement of a takeover. One important exception is Seyhun (1990) , who analyzes the trading patterns of top corporate managers in bidder firms around the announcement of takeover attempts using a sample of 393 U.S. mergers and tender offers from January 1975 to March 1986.
Seyhun finds that bidders' executives tend to trade heavily prior to the announcement of a takeover bid, and there is a significant relationship between the nature of the insiders' trades and the market reaction to the acquisition announcement. Specifically, in takeover bids with positive (negative) excess returns, bidder insiders tend to be purchasers (sellers) of their own firm's shares in the months leading up to the announcement.
Although Seyhun (1990) confirms the existence of insider trading in bidders' stocks, it is not without limitation due to the exclusion of insider trading by both non-executive insider and non-corporate insiders.
2 First, not all insiders are directors or managers. Szockyj and Geis (2002) show that, among all civil and criminal charges in the U.S. between 1980 and 1989, only 26% of the defendants of insider trading cases are actually officers and directors. Meulbroek (1992) reports that only 24% of defendants were employees in insider trading cases prosecuted by SEC for the same period. Second, corporate insiders might intentionally choose not to disclose illegal 1 See, e.g., Dodd (1980) , Keown and Pinketon (1981) , Asquith (1983) , Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) , Dennis and McConnell (1986) . 2 A non-corporate insider is anyone who has material private information of one issuer and has no legal obligation to report his trading in that stock, such as analysts, lawyers, friends or relatives of insiders.
trading through other means (such as reports mandated by regulators), which would lead data based on such reports to underestimate the extent of the problem. Therefore, results relying on regulatory data might fail to provide a complete picture of the actual extent of insider trading.
Moreover, Seyhun's analysis is based on the data between 1975 and 1986. Market conditions, regulation and enforcement have changed significantly since this period, making it worthwhile to revisit this issue. With that in mind, a general study using recent data, which examines systematically stock performance and trading activities, will provide a better understanding of current insider trading activities in acquirers' stocks.
Stylized Facts on Announcement Returns of Acquirer's stock
To understand the ways in which acquirer share prices might move in advance of a takeover announcement, in this section we review stylized facts from the literature on announcement returns associated with acquirers' stock. This literature shows that mergers and acquisitions generate predictable movements in acquirers' stock prices depending on the characteristics of the target, the acquirer and the nature of the acquisition. The Appendix summarizes this literature in tabular form.
Private Acquisitions
Whether the target firm is private or public potentially has a significant impact on acquirer announcement returns. Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions usually focus on very short-run market reaction to announcements, 3 based on the underlying assumption that stock markets are informationally efficient and react correctly to the news. In general, these studies show that firms acquiring private targets outperform those acquiring public firms over the short period around announcement. One explanation for this phenomenon is that private firms are harder to value and face an illiquidity discount, so the acquirer pays less and the announcement return is often positive for a private acquisition (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al, 2006; Officer, 2007) . Capron and Shen (2007) confirm this finding using unique survey data and a two-stage model to control for the endogeneity of choice of target.
3 Most papers consider 2 to 5 days CARs (Chang, 1998; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 2001; Fuller et al, 2002; Masulis and Nahata, 2009). There are other studies, however, that suggest underperformance associated with private acquisitions. From an information asymmetry perspective, there is substantially more information asymmetry concerning the takeover itself and the private target's value compared to a public-target acquisition, because privately held companies are more opaque than publicly traded companies.
Private firms do not have to publish their financial statements and have scant analyst following and disclosure requirements, which makes it difficult for investors to acquire information about a private target. Acquisitions of private firms are often carried out with the view to avoiding disclosure requirements associated with an IPO (Carpentier et al., 2008) .
Another strand of literature focuses on long-term post-merger. Agrawal et al. (1992) find a negative and significant relation between the market reaction to the announcement and the subsequent performance of the firm. However, they find that this relation is not persistent over their entire sample period. Loughran and Vijh (1997) examine the post-announcement returns and argue that markets systematically overestimate or underestimate the efficiency gains from acquisitions. André, Kooli, and L'Her (2004) find that Canadian acquirers significantly underperform over the three-year post-event period, and perform particularly worse for equity financed deals and cross-border deals. Further, they note that the long-term negative abnormal returns may be explained by a slow adjustment to the acquisition announcement. This long term underperformance is consistent with recent findings in Maksimovic et al. (2009) , who examine productivity differences between private and public acquisitions. They show that higher quality firms choose to become public and participate more in productivity-increasing mergers. This evidence of lower productivity of privately held firms implies underperformance of the acquirer post-announcement for the typical private acquisition.
In short, the literature shows both positive and negative post-announcement returns to acquirers in private acquisitions. This implies that it is worth examining potential heterogeneity within the class of private acquisitions in our empirical analysis below.
PE-backed Firm
Private equity firms extensively screen the companies in which they invest, facilitate professionalization of the firm, and certify the quality of the firm to the new owners. Empirical evidence confirms the fact that acquisitions of PE-backed firms have significantly positive announcement returns (Masulis and Nahata, 2009 ), due to the value-added provided by PE funds (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007 Transaction risks are also more pronounced among more highly-leveraged acquirers. It is difficult to assess the effect of leverage, as it is potentially non-linear. Leverage may have positive value in some contexts or for certain ranges. For instance, Maloney et al. (1993) find that bidders with higher leverage are able to make better acquisitions, but excessive leverage may bring about agency problems (such as risk shifting, underinvestment and asset stripping, among other agency problems often discussed in the literature); and increase the risk of liquidation.
Cross-Border Acquisitions
Compared to domestic acquisitions, cross-border takeover bids are more complex since they usually involve the legal entities governed by local rules which might translate into legal In short, prior work consistently shows announcement CARs to be lower for foreign targets. Assuming insiders are capable of predicting the market reaction to the pending announcement using their private information, we will expect to see a significantly negative preannouncement run-up, which would warrant further investigation.
Payment Method
A large numbers of prior works discuss the impact of the method of payment on acquisition announcement returns. Myers and Majluf (1984) model stock payment and demonstrate that firms use stock as acquisition currency when they believe their equity is overvalued. Knowing that, target shareholders tend not to accept stock. Therefore, signaling theory suggests that higher-valued bidders will use cash or a higher proportion of cash to signal their value to the market (Fishman, 1989; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Eckbo at el, 1990) .
Hansen (1987) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) address the choice of method of payment in the target valuation uncertainty context. They suggest that bidders make stock offers when they are uncertain about targets' value, in order to implement risk sharing by target shareholders.
Empirical evidence provides support to the overvaluation theory as takeovers financed by cash have greater announcement CAR than do those where the consideration is stock (Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Martin 1996; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Fuller at al. 2002) . Martin (1996) shows that, in the case of bidder uncertainty, shares are more likely to be chosen as the method of payment. Chang (1998) and Fuller at al. (2002) provide evidence that stock offers outperform cash offers in the acquisition of private firms.
In sum, the literature consistently shows announcement CARs are lower for acquisitions where payment is in the form of the acquirer's stock. Run-up CARs that are significantly negative for share acquisitions are in effect highly suggestive of insider trading and warrant further investigation
Summary
This section reviewed literature that consistently shows announcement returns are relatively more predictable for private targets, PE-backed targets, foreign targets, riskier acquirers, and share payment acquisitions. The predictability of the market reaction to a takeover depending on the factors discussed above makes it possible for an insider to profit from material non-public information relating to an acquisition by selling (buying) the acquirer's stock when the expected market reaction is negative (positive), causing abnormal price declines (increases). Therefore, if insider trading has occurred, we will expect to observe a link between run-up CARs and deal features. In the next section, we empirically test the proposition that run-up CARs match such expected post-announcement acquirer returns.
Data and Summary Statistics

Data and variables
We collected from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions
Database a list of mergers and takeover announcements, in which the acquirer is a public Canadian company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), with the announcement date between January 1991 and December 2008. Leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, and privatizations are excluded from our sample. We also manually check and adjust the announcement day of each transaction using Lexis-Nexis.
In order to consider acquisitions with sufficient data, announcements of deals are included in the sample if the deal value is more than CAD 1 million, the acquiring firm is listed on the TSXCanadian Financial Markets Research Centre (TSX-CFMRC) Summary Information Database, the acquiring firm is not a financial or utility firm the target is either a public firm or a private firm, the acquiring firm acquires (or attempts to acquire) at least 50% of the target firm's shares, and the deal value is not smaller than 1% of the market value of the acquirer. If the acquirer made two takeover attempts in less than 90 days, the second attempt is excluded from our sample. Finally,
following Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), and Bouwman et al. (2009) , we require that the target is not a subsidiary. We note that while we did not differentiate between completed and unsuccessful deals, only six of the deals announced in our dataset were completed.
The definitions of the variables used in the analyses are provided in Table 1 . The preannouncement CAR for each acquirer is calculated over the window of -40 to -2 trading day prior to the takeover announcement. Daily abnormal return is computed using a market model. The estimation period is [-250, -70] trading days and the CFMRC equal-weighted index is used to proxy for market return. 4 To estimate the market model, we require that there must be no less than 50 non-missing returns during the estimation period. Our sample screening procedure yields a final sample of 736 mergers and acquisitions, including 270 public targets and 466 private targets.
Cumulative abnormal transactions are computed as the difference between the actual daily transactions and the average daily transactions over the estimation period.
-- Table 1 However Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S34 concentrates on U.S. securities, with a limited set of non-U.S. securities. As a result, the number in our sample is likely to be downward biased. The simple statistics shows that, in our sample, 78.99% of all institutional investors are from the U.S.
We consider three measures to capture institutional holding: (1) the number of institutional investors, (2) the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors, 5 and (3) a dummy variable equal to one if the bidder has at least one institutional investor from the same country as its target. Institutional investors have a non-arm's length relation with local firms, which transfers into an information advantage in the cross-country acquisition setting. Institutional holdings especially matter for acquisitions of private targets since having the same physical location makes it easier for institutional investors to obtain more information through non-public channels.
Institutional holding has been widely used as a proxy for information asymmetry. 6 It is generally agreed that institutional investors are better informed because of their superior access to private information as well as their better resource and lower average costs to acquire information.
Furthermore, institutions are more efficient in processing information and trade more efficiently than retail investors. Extant evidence has shown that institutional trading is positively associated with the information contained in earnings announcements (Seppi, 1992) . Chakravarty (2001) argues that trades initiated by institutions are more informed and have a larger cumulative price impact than those initiated by retail investors. In the acquisition setting, greater institutional holdings imply that the information about the takeover is more likely to be known before the official announcement, and as such, there is a higher chance of information leakage and trading on private information.
In addition to institutional investor coverage, we use another proxy for information asymmetry suggested by Masulis and Korwar (1986) We include year dummy variables into our analysis to account for changing economic and institutional conditions over time. 7 To account for industry effects, we also create bidder industry dummies based on two-digit SIC code. Following Fuller et al. (2002), we introduce a diversifying dummy, which is set to 1 if both the acquirer and target firm have the same 3-digit SIC code. (2005) and Bris (2005) , and surveillance data from Cumming and Johan (2008) and Cumming et al. (2009) , but those factors were immaterial to our analysis. The insignificance of these rules likely reflects the fact that rules are most important for the acquirer country, and all acquirers in our data are based in Canada. Masulis and Nahata (2009) provide evidence that acquiring PE-backed targets leads to significantly higher acquirer announcement returns, even after controlling for deal characteristics and endogeneity. We introduce a dummy variable PE, which is set to one for target firms financed by PE funds, and zero otherwise. The PE financing information is taken from the SDC VentureXpert database, which identifies investments made by corporate divisions, subsidiaries and venture capital and private equity firms directly affiliated with corporations. Table 2 Panel A provides summary statistics of both the dependent and independent variables used in our analysis. For all observations in the data, the run-up CAR equal weighted over the window [-40, -2] is negatively significant, with an average of -1.52%, ranging from -51.90% to 44.71%, and the median is -0.56%. The CAR value weighted and CAR composite are not very different from the equal weighted CAR, with an average of -1.51% and -1.46%, respectively, both significant lower than zero, and with a median of 0.58% and 0.28%, respectively. The mean and median cumulative abnormal transactions are 1499 and 99, respectively, and both are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Summary statistics and comparison tests
-- Table 2 About Here --In our sample, 63.3% of the targets are private firms. The majority of the targets are Canadian firms, comprising 62.1% of the sample. U.S. targets comprise a significant portion of our sample, equal to 26.6% of the targets, while the other countries comprise 11.3%. Table 2 Panel B presents the details of target nationality. Although the run-up CAR appears significantly negative for the overall sample, the partition of the sample by different measures including target type, country and method of payment reveals a different picture. Figure 1 presents the pre-announcement CAR over the window [-40, +30] for firm acquiring Canadian targets by method of payment from which we observe that the method of payment plays an important role in the determination of firms performance prior to and after the takeover announcement. Cash offers show a positive price run-up before the formal announcement of the takeover deal, which is followed by a big increase during the announcement period ([-1, 1] day window) and then stabilizes over the following month. We do not see any abnormal price movement for stock offers prior to the announcement. For mixed offers, the price seems to follow random walk until about 10 days prior to the announcement, at which point it shows a sharp increase over the following period. Further dividing the sample into public and private target groups demonstrates that the above patterns are mainly driven by the public target group. Similar patters emerge in Figure 2 for Canadian public target groups. Compared to the whole Canadian target group, the Canadian public target group shows even bigger increases in equity price prior to the announcement when cash is only method of payment, while there is no large change in price during the 3-day announcement period as well as the following one month period. Similar to Figure 1 , stock and mixed offers do not present abnormal patterns before the announcement. Though not reported here, we plot the same chart for Canadian firms acquiring private targets, in which we do not see any significant pre-announcement price movement for either method of payment group. To summarize, for Canadian targets, information leakage is likely to happen when acquirers use cash to purchase a target firm, which is even more likely when the target is a listed firm.
The U.S. target sample experiences different patterns. The phenomenon depicted in the graphs is confirmed by the statistics in Table 3 . In the Canadian public target sample, cash offer acquisitions experience an average of 4.02% cumulative abnormal returns before the announcement, which is both economically and statistically significant. However, the announcement return for this group is as small as 0.10% (no different than zero). In contrast, on average stock offers only see an insignificant CAR of 0.69% prior to the announcement, followed by a significant abnormal price drop of -1.78% around the announcement.
For mixed offers, the pre-announcement averages 2.67%, not statistically different than zero.
Consistent with the graph, for Canadian firms taking over U.S. public targets, stock offers lead to a very significant abnormal price underperformance of -12.29% over the -40 to -2 window. Some might argue that the result might not be reliable due to the small sample size. However, the median CAR Equal Weighted is also as substantial as -11.71%, significant at 10% level. Considering that the mean and median announcement CARs are only 1.84% and -0.90%, respectively, neither statistically nor economically significant, it is reasonable to say that U.S. target stock offers are associated with price drops before announcements.
-- Table 3 About Here -- Table 4 presents the comparison study by target type. In the full sample, private targets experience an average run-up CARs of -3.30%, which is both economically and statistically significant. In contrast, the public-target acquisition shows insignificant run-up CARs equal to 1.50%. The results are similar if either CFMRC value-weighted or TSX Composite index are used as a proxy for market return. Furthermore, mean and median comparison tests confirm that takeovers involving a private target has more negative pre-announcement run-ups, both significant at the 1% level, regardless of the choice of market return. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, compared to acquiring a public target, insiders involved in private target acquisition deals possess more material non-public information, which translates into more significant price change in acquirers' stock if they trade on it. The mean cumulative abnormal transaction is equal to 2441.91 for public-target acquisition, highly significant. Moreover, compared to private-targets, public-targets experience a much greater number of transactions before takeover announcement. However, the median cumulative abnormal transaction of both private-target and public-target are indistinguishable. These statistics might suggest that the phenomenon is driven by highly liquid stocks. A possible explanation is that acquirers of public targets are usually larger than acquirers of private targets (Table 4 Panel B), and larger firm is usually more liquid and thus shows a greater number of transactions.
-- Table 4 About Here --We carried out separate comparison tests pertinent to other variables related to information asymmetry. First, to examine whether the number of institutional investors matters for preannouncement CARs, we divided the sample into two groups in terms of whether the number of institutional investors of the acquirer is larger or smaller than the sample median. However, there is no significant difference of CAR between the high and low groups. Second, we repeated this exercise for the standard deviation of the market model. There are differences in medians such that higher standard deviation is associated with significantly lower run-up CARs, but differences in means are not significant. These comparison tests are available on request.
Empirical studies show a link between firm and deal characteristics and takeover announcement returns. We will observe the relationship between the characteristics and preannouncement price change, if it is due to insider trading since insiders will be able to predict market reaction and act on it. Our comparison tests show that acquirers experience significantly larger pre-announcement price drops if they are engaged in a diversifying acquisition (not explicitly reported for reasons of conciseness). Table 5 tests whether cross-border acquisitions are associated with pronounced negative run-up CARs, considering that acquiring a foreign firm involves higher regulatory risks. Canadian acquirers experience abnormal price drop of about 3-5% before the takeover announcement when they are engaged in acquisition of a foreign target, regardless of its nationality. In contrast, acquiring a Canadian target is associated with about 1% run-up CARs. The comparison test shows that there exists significant difference between domestic and foreign acquisitions, regardless of the measures used for equal weighted, value-weighted or composite CARs. Note, however, there are no significant differences in means or medians in terms of cumulative abnormal transactions for domestic versus foreign targets.
-- Table 5 About Here --As discussed in subsection 2.4, studies show significant market reactions to takeover announcements depending on the method of payment. In our full sample the data indicate that, on average, stock and mixed payment are associated with negative CARs equal weighted, which are -3.10% and -2.30%, respectively, and both significantly at 10% level. The run-up CARs for cash offers are 2.70% (1.9%) less than that of stock offer (mixed offer), though indistinguishable from zero. Since the literature shows that acquirers' performance is also affected by factors other than method of payment (Table 6 confirms the correlation between those factors), we repeat the test by institutional investor in the U.S. Log Asset is highly negatively correlated to standard deviation of market model, which makes sense since there is less information asymmetry concerning larger firms due to more prevalent media and analyst coverage. In the multivariate analyses immediately below, we exclude variables in the same regressions with these types of collinearity problems.
-- Table 6 About Here --
Regression Analyses
This section presents multivariate tests of our hypotheses controlling for various economic and institutional determinants of the pre-announcement return. For each regression, we control for both year and industry effects using dummy variables. We two-way cluster standard errors by both year and bidder (Petersen, 2009 ). Table 1 ).
-- Table 7 About Here --Thirteen models are presented in Table 7 to show robustness to alternative specifications.
Models 1 and 2 in Table 7 use the full sample and consider alternative explanatory variables.
Model 3 also uses the full sample of all acquisitions. Model 3 differs from Models 1 and 2 by treating the decision to acquire a public versus a private firm as a decision variable with a treatment regression. The first-step equation is a probit regression where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for US private targets paid with stock (that is, treating each as a joint choice variable) and 0 otherwise. This first step decision is a function of the standard deviation of the market model, Tobin's Q, and assets, as well as industry and year dummy variables. 8 In the second step, we employ variables similar to those reported in Model 1. Models 4 and 5 are single step models which consider the subsample for public targets and private targets separately. Models 6, 7 and 8 consider the subsamples for Canadian targets, Canadian public targets, and Canadian private targets, respectively. Models 9 and 10 consider the subsamples of U.S. targets and non-Canadian and non-U.S. targets. Models 11, 12 and 13 consider the subsamples of shares, mixed and cashonly payments.
The coefficient for private targets in Model 1 is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that within the 40 days prior to takeover announcement, the bidder's price drops by 4.5% for private targets relative to public targets. This evidence is consistent with the negative post-announcement returns for private acquisitions depicted in Figure 4 . Figure 5 highlights the fact that post announcement returns for private acquisitions are highly heterogeneous. We ran separate regressions for run-up CARs (not reported in Table 7 but available on request) for quintiles ranked by announcement day return. These regressions indicate the same negative and statistically significant effect of private acquisitions and very similar economic significance for all quintiles, with the sole exception of the top quintile which yielded a statistically insignificant coefficient for private targets, consistent with Figure 5 .
While private targets exhibit significantly negative run-up CARs, PE-backed private acquisitions experience positive and significant pre-run-up CARs. In Model 1 the effect is significant at the 10% level, and the economic significance is such that CARs of PE-backed targets are 10% larger than non-PE-backed targets. This finding is consistent with the post-announcement return depicted in Figure 6 , and likewise consistent with prior evidence (Masulis and Nahata, 2009 ). 8 We also estimated Step 1 of Model 3 by including the U.S. and Other Country dummies in the first stage regression.
Those coefficients were positive and significant, and the Inverse Mills Ratio becomes significant. But regardless, the inclusion or exclusion of these and other variables does not affect the other reported results for either Step 1 or Step 2 of Model 3. Alternative specifications are available on request.
There is some evidence of the importance of information asymmetry from the coefficient of the standard deviation of the market model in Model 1. The effect is negative and significant, as expected, and the economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in the standard deviation reduces run-up CARs by 2% (although this effect is insignificant in Model 2). The number of institutional holders of the acquirer similarly has the expected sign, but the effect is statistically insignificant. We further investigated whether percentage holdings by institutional investors explained the variation of run-up CARs, but that variable is likewise insignificant and therefore not reported. In Models 1 and 2, firm specific risk factors such as diversifying acquisitions or leverage have the expected sign but are statistically insignificant. Tobin's q is significantly negatively associated with run-up CARs in Models 1 and 2. A negative sign for Tobin's q may reflect insiders' belief that their equity is overvalued, and as such lower the run-up CARs. It is similarly possible that agency problems of overvalued equity lead insiders make less than value-maximizing acquisitions (Jensen, 2005) . The economic significance of the effect is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in Tobin's q reduces run-up CARs by 3%.
Since cross-border mergers are significantly influenced by regulatory costs, we expect negative coefficients for the U.S. and other countries dummy variables. Both the U.S. and other country dummies are negative, as expected, but only the U.S. country dummy variable is significant (and at the 5% level). In Model 1, relative to a domestic takeover, a Canadian acquirer will see its stock price underperform by 3.7% pre-announcement of the takeover when it is engaged in acquiring a U.S. target.
Model 1 shows share and mixed payments are associated with significantly lower run-up CARs (at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively). Share payments are associated with lower run-up CARs by 4.9%, while mixed payments are associated with 2.3% lower CARs. These findings are consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) .
Model 2 includes interaction terms for private targets with target country as well as private targets with method of payment. Consistent with expectations, we see foreign private acquisitions exhibit stronger and statistically significant price declines. CARs for U.S. private targets decline by 4.4%, and this effect is significant at the 1% level. CARs for other country private targets decline 9 We did not uncover nonlinear specifications for leverage that were arguably superior to the specifications reported.
by 4.9%, and this effect is significant at the 10% level. Further, Model 2 includes terms that combine private targets with share payments and mixed payments. The evidence shows shares * private is negative and significant at the 5% level, with the economic significance at a reduction of 7% in CARs.
To summarize, Models 1 and 2 provide strong support for the proposition that predictable movements in acquirer returns post-announcement are associated with run-up CARs the move in the same direction in a statistically and economically significant way. This is suggestive evidence that insider trading is more likely for private targets, for firms with greater information asymmetry (proxied by the standard deviation of the market model), higher Tobin's q, foreign acquisitions, and share payments. PE-backed targets have higher run-up CARs, while the standard deviation of market-model residuals and Tobin's q are both negative and significant at magnitudes similar to that in Models 1 and 2. Also, note in Model 3 that the leverage of the acquirer is negative and significant at the 10% level, and shows that a 1-standard deviation in leverage reduces run-up CARs by 7.7%. Table 7 consider a number of different subsets of the sample to assess robustness. Models 4 and 5 are separate regressions for public and private targets, respectively.
Models 4-13 in
PE-backed targets have a positive and significant impact on run-up CARs in Models 4 and 5. The dummy variable for the U.S. is negative and significant at the 5% level in both Models 4 and 5.
The dummy variable for Other Country is insignificant in Models 4 and 5. The economic significance of these effects is comparable to that reported above for Model 1. Overall, the findings are quite consistent regardless if the target is public or private. q. This evidence is highly consistent with the evidence in Table 7 for equal-weighted CARs in terms of both economic and statistical significance. (Table 2 ). This result suggests that on average private acquisitions are less likely to be known than public acquisitions or the acquirer of private targets tend to be smaller and less liquid (Table 4) . A one-standard deviation increase in Tobin's q increases cumulative abnormal transactions by 1247, consistent with the idea that insiders are likely to trade pre-announcement where risks are more pronounced. Finally, a one-standard deviation increase in log assets increases cumulative abnormal transactions by 1707, which is intuitive as larger acquirers have less information asymmetry and attract additional attention from institutional and other investors.
Conclusions
This paper examined for the first time the pre-announcement share price and transaction dynamics of acquirers in response to public versus private acquisitions. The central hypothesis tested in this paper is that insider trading potentially exists where pre-announcement CARs significantly move in the same direction as expected post-announcement CARs. We reviewed related literature that has established stylized facts regarding the extent to which takeover announcement returns are predictable.
We examined 736 Canadian acquirers acquiring targets in Canada, the U.S. and 31 other countries around the world over the years [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The Canadian setting is a useful forum by virtue of its legal similarity to the U.S., and the propensity of acquirers to acquire both private and public companies in Canada and abroad. The data examined show systematic evidence of preannouncement movement in acquirer stock worthy of investigation depending on the characteristics of the acquirer (including Tobin's q), characteristics of the target (including private versus public, as well as PE-backing), and method of payment (shares versus cash versus mixed).
In the course of our analyses, we showed these findings to be statistically significant and economically large, and robust to 2-step treatment regressions for the non-random choice to target a private firm, alternative explanatory variables, different event window lengths, different benchmarks to generate CARs, and subsets of the data.
Our findings are consistent with other studies of insider trading and add to the body of knowledge by providing unique evidence of insider trading of acquirer's stock. The results have policy implications for surveillance authorities. Monitoring and analysis of trades in acquirers' stock for both public and private targets can be focused on transactions that generate predictable movements in acquirers' share prices. Our findings suggest where insider trading is more likely to be observed, and as such, where surveillance and enforcement could be more efficiently directed.
Appendix
This Appendix presents a review of the literature on post-announcement performance of acquisitions. Papers, datasets and findings are summarized in Table A-1. This paper analyzes the effects of PE backing on profitability of acquisition of private firm s. It finds that PE backing leads to significantly higher acquirer announcement returns, averaging 3%, after controlling for other factors, which is due to PEs' conflicts of interest with entrepreneurs and other investors. Table 1 and summarized in Table 2 for targets from Canada, US and other countries. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
